Sparked both by normative concerns and a classic empirical puzzle, scholars developed and tested a variety of explanations for the turnout decline in the US between 1960 and 1988. More than a decade of research eventually showed that the sources of the decline in turnout were multifaceted: it stemmed in various degrees from declines in partisanship, political efficacy and newspaper reading, mobilization, and changes in the age distribution in the electorate with lower rates of participation in younger cohorts.
in 1988 and 1996. Voters had not entirely vanished, but commentators who regarded voter turnout as a thermometer measuring the health of American democracy were clearly worried. Understanding the sources of the recent increase in turnout is not only significant in its own right and in assessing whether the reversal of fortune can be sustained, but it will also offer a check on the robustness of explanations of the earlier turnout decline. If shifts in citizens' attitudes (such as partisanship) really caused the fall of turnout, we should see a turnaround in those attitudes concomitant with the latest surge in voter participation. Or if the decline in turnout was mostly attributable to the decline in voter mobilization, we should see evidence of a resumption of contacting that accounts for the latest increase in voter participation. In short, a In the remainder of this paper, I review the major explanations for the decline in turnout in the 1970s, 80s, and 90s. I then outline an approach in determining the sources of the recent increase in voter participation, and discuss how applications of that approach help to provide insights into the role that changes in social composition the potential electorate, attitudes about parties, contact with parties and campaigns, and electoral laws have played in the resurgence of turnout in the United States. I conclude with observations about the compatibility between my explanation of the turnout surge with explanations of the previous turnout decline, and offer suggestions for future research.
Turnout Decline and the Puzzle of Participation

Electoral Laws
In posing the "puzzle of participation," Brody (1978) observed that the decline in turnout from 1960 to 1976 had occurred precisely when changes in the legal context were making registration and voting substantially easier. A combination of various Supreme Court decisions, the 24 th Amendment, the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and the 1965 Voting Rights Act were successful in untangling the Southern web of intimidation, discriminatory administrative discretion, and state laws that had been designed to evade the 15 th Amendment, as Southern turnout increased among both blacks and whites. (Stanley 1987) But apparently there were no spillover effects in other parts of the country, where voter participation declined precipitously. In short, turnout was declining while courts, states, and Congress were in the process of making it easier to vote. (Teixeira 1992, 29-30) In their comprehensive analysis of the decline in turnout, Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) estimate that the liberalization of voter registration (through the abolition of literacy tests and poll taxes, the near abolition of the requirement to periodically re-register, as well as later closing dates) helped to abate the decline in participation between the 1960s and 1980s. If citizens of the 1980s had faced the registration hurdles present in the early 1960s, Rosenstone and Hansen estimate that turnout would have been 1.8% lower than it actually was.
Demographics
Turnout decline in spite of liberalized voter registration was especially puzzling because rising levels of education would have been expected to increase most citizens' capacities for understanding the political choices of the day, as well as in navigating the remaining administrative requirements for registration and casting a ballot. Older cohorts who had had more limited opportunities for higher education were being replaced by younger cohorts who were taking advantage of the democratization of educational opportunity, but failing to translate those skills into votes. Brody surmised that "the demographic changes in the electorate, to the extent they relate to turnout, on balance would lead us to expect higher rather than lower rates of participation." (1978, 299) The passing of time exacerbated Brody's puzzle. Two major works that analyzed ANES and Census data from 1960 to 1988 showed that the turnout decline persisted in the face of continuing changes in demography that should have been correlated with higher turnout. (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Teixeira 1992) Most importantly, the proportion of Americans who had at least tried college continued to grow, which, with the strong relationship between education and voting, would have been expected to result in a 1988 turnout rate about 2.8 points higher than the 1960 rate, ceteris paribus. (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993, 214-215; Teixeira 1992, 36) Moreover, family income increased and more women were electing to work outside the home (Schlozman, Burns, and Verba 1999) , which combined with changes in the distribution of education, should have resulted in a total SES adjusted turnout rate 3.9 points higher than the 1960 post-War peak. (Teixeira 1992, 36) On the other hand, there were some social trends in the population during this period that helped account for lower turnout. Americans were younger and fewer of them were married and regular church attenders in 1988 compared to 1960, but the net effect of those variables and SES in a comprehensive model would still have lead us to expect higher turnout at the end of this period. In short, demographics did not do a good job of explaining the decline in turnout from .
Perceptions of closeness
In the simple version of rational choice theory, people should be slightly more likely to vote when they believe that an election is going to be close, or with higher levels of p in the classic calculus of voting (Riker and Ordeshook 1968) . Empirical support for this prediction has been decidedly mixed, and eyeballing the aggregate decline in turnout from the 1960s to the 1990s does not inspire much confidence. Both nail-biters and landslides were predicted (and occurred) in both relatively high turnout years (the presidential election in 1960 was breathtakingly close, 1964 wasn't) and low turnout years (1976 was also very close, 1984
wasn't). Grofman (1993) suggests that these and other mixed or null findings occur, in part, because of neglect of other exogenous variables or electoral contexts that might affect both perceived closeness and expected turnout, 2 and too short of a time frame.
Looking over a broader time frame and a wider space, Franklin (2004) found that an increase in non-competitive elections did contribute to a general decline in turnout in Western democracies (including but not limited to the United States) from 1945 to 1999 through a rolling cohort effect. Franklin argues that young people are particularly responsive to the structural conditions at the time of their initiation into the electoral system, so they are less likely to vote if elections are routine, not salient, and uncompetitive as they reach adulthood and the age of suffrage. Having missed the opportunity to develop the habit of voting early (Plutzer 2002 ), these cohorts affect aggregate level turnout for years, until they are ultimately replaced by a generation socialized during an environment more conducive to participation. Thus, while perceptions of closeness are not strongly correlated with turnout in the short term, the long term effects can be substantial.
Parties
Party identification was about to reach its nadir when Brody posed his puzzle (Wattenberg 1998) , suggesting a possible link between the concomitant declines in turnout and partisanship. Early analyses found that the partisan dealignment could explain between 25% and 30% of the decline in turnout in presidential elections between 1960 and 1980 (Abramson and Aldrich 1982; Shaffer 1981) , though critics argued that the omission of consideration of covariates, especially education, inflated the estimate of the impact of changes in partisanship on turnout in those models (Cassel and Luskin 1988) . Later analyses based on more comprehensive models over a longer time span showed that changing attitudes about the two major parties did have an impact on the turnout decline, but the overall effect was rather modest due to a rather stable trend in the number of pure independents and an increase in the proportion of people who saw differences between the two major parties. (Teixeira 1992, 40-42) 
Mobilization
None of the usual demographic or attitudinal variables, or any combination of them, resolved Brody's puzzle of the decline in participation fully. Americans were somewhat less partisan and more "individualist" in the 1970s (Tom Wolfe's "me" decade) and in the 1980s than they had been in the 1960s, but the net effects of those variables explained less than half of the decline between 1960 and 1988 (Teixeira 1992, 46-50) . Lower levels of political interest and efficacy added much to the explanation of turnout decline in a statistical sense, but in another sense, those variables are almost too close to the dependent variable (the "tip of the funnel") to be very interesting theoretically. Rosenstone and Hansen's (1993) analysis shifted the focus of responsibility for the decline in participation away from the individual and toward campaigns and linkage groups. As the increasing usage and costs of "air wars" (electronic media) and primary elections claimed more and more resources from political campaigns and interest groups, the resources available for "ground wars" (mobilization) in the general election dwindled. As a result, contacting by parties in presidential election years peaked in 1972 and then began to drop sharply over the next two decades. Moreover, partisan contacting was increasingly limited to the "right people," those who have characteristics that already predispose them to vote (strong partisans, people in strong social networks, well-educated, and wealthy). Rosenstone and Hansen's "Solving the Puzzle of Participation in Electoral Politics" chapter (1993, (211) (212) (213) (214) (215) (216) (217) (218) (219) (220) (221) (222) (223) (224) (225) (226) (227) attributed over half of the decline in turnout to the weakening efforts to mobilize citizens to vote. 3 Moreover, this general explanation is supported by evidence from a growing number of field experiments that show significant effects of contacting on turnout in a variety of electoral contexts. (Gerber and Green 2000; Green and Gerber 2008; Middleton and Green 2008; Nickerson, Friedrichs, and King 2006) Data and Method My analysis begins by recognizing two necessary conditions that must be met before we can conclude that some factor shares some of the credit for the recent surge in voter turnout.
First, the factor must be correlated with voter turnout, and second, its distribution must have calculated and applied a secondary weight that results in the reported turnout in each presidential election year being equal to the actual VEP turnout rate.
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Second, ANES must continually balance the value of consistency in repeating the same questions year after year against the value of improvements in measurement, which has resulted in question wording changes in measures of some of the key concepts, including voter participation itself. (Duff et al. 2007) In some cases, question wording changes can be accommodated by some careful recoding or preliminary analyses that suggest that changes were benign with respect to this kind of analysis. But in other cases, significant changes in the survey meant that only half-samples in some years could be used (as the party differences question was asked on only form in 1996), and in others, non-comparability in measurement of a given variable precluded estimating its effects on turnout over multiple points in time.
Third, in 2012, ANES greatly expanded its sample size by including a large number of internet only respondents, in addition to those interviewed face-to-face. Preliminary results on some key variables, including turnout, suggest that the mode of the interview could have a substantial effect on the distribution of responses. As a conservative strategy, I chose to include only the face-to-face respondents in 2012.
Finally, like most survey data, the ANES studies are replete with missing data due to item non-response, or varying numbers of respondents opting out of providing answers to particular questions. As an alternative to listwise deletion that can distort estimations in multivariate analyses (King et al. 2001) , I used multiple imputation of missing data to produce five replicate for married/partnered, homeownership, and being in a union household), partisan attitudes (categories of partisan strength and perceptions of party differences), perceptions of election closeness, mobilization variables (contact by parties, contact by other, and an interaction between the two), electoral laws (dummies for the presence of election day registration, no-fault absentee voting, and early voting in the state in which the respondent resides), and dummy variables for year (omitting the 1996 baseline year). The model is successful to the degree that it produces a simulated 1996 electorate that matches the higher turnout rates in later years.
6 Table 1 shows the estimated logit model of self-reported voter turnout in the presidential elections between 1996 and 2012, inclusive, based on multiple imputation of the pooled ANES time-series data and weights that were readjusted to reflect the actual VEP turnout rates in each election. By and large, the coefficients in the model behave as expected. The coefficients for the dummy year variables are statistically unreliable, which is our first indication that the substantive variables in the model are accounting for much of the observed surge in turnout over the period from 1996 through 2012.
7 Table 1 We can see how much of the turnout increase from 1996 to 2012 might be attributable to changes in the distribution of the variables included in the model by using the estimated coefficients in Table 1 Table 1 People are slightly more likely to vote when they believe that an election is going to be close, which rational choice theorists ascribe to individuals' perceptions that they would have a greater probability of affecting the outcome of the election, the p term in the classic calculus of voting (Riker and Ordeshook 1968) . Though it is conceivable that other mechanisms could drive this relationship,
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The answer to both questions is "yes." In 1996, when President Clinton had the largest margin of victory in the popular vote (8.5%) in this period, a bare majority of the public thought that the presidential election would be close. Four years later, over four fifths of the public anticipated that the election between Al Gore and George W. Bush would be close, though few could have imagined just how thin the margin between the two major party candidates would be both nationally and in a single pivotal state (Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde 2002, 46-70) . (Hillygus and Shields 2008) While direct mail and other contacting is both more focused in content and increasingly targeted to "micro" groups, its sheer volume, as well as other forms of campaign activity, has led to a notable increase in the number of people reporting some contact over the course of the campaign.
Moreover, the increase in contacting has had a significant effect on turnout. Figure 10 shows Fortunately, the tools that were available for previous scholars to decompose the sources of the turnout decline are still available for our use in analyzing the rebound. Pooled crosssectional analyses of comparable survey data gathered over successive elections enabled Teixeira (1992), Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) , and others to assess which factors were most closely correlated with the fall in turnout from the early 1960s to the late 1980s. Using a similar design with some refinements in this paper, I have traced the sources of the increase in turnout that has occurred since the endpoint of their analyses. While many scholars in our field have grown accustomed to using American National Election Study data to answer questions like this one, we should not take the availability of those data for granted. ANES data are far from perfect, but they are vitally important for the analysis of longitudinal trends in public opinion and political behavior, and the absence of a midterm election study in 2006 should serve as a reminder of how much we depend on the continuity of the ANES data to answer questions about changes in behavior.
In the early studies cited at the beginning of this paper, the spread of education and the liberalization of voting requirements exacerbated rather than solved the puzzle of turnout decline. Since 1996, neither demographic factors nor voting reforms have accounted for much of the increase in voter turnout. While larger shares of the mass public continue to avail themselves of expanding educational opportunities, any positive effect of education on turnout has largely been offset by continuing estrangement from important social linkages in society (marriage, unions, and churches, in particular), and too few (large) states have adopted the most effective electoral reform (Election Day Registration) to account for much of the increase in turnout. The mass public has more or less accurately perceived the polarization of the parties in government (Bafumi and Shapiro 2009; Stonecash 2006) , and that perception of greater differences does seem to have substantially contributed to the increase in turnout. When more of the public thinks that the parties offer more than "a dime's worth of difference," (Craig and Martinez 1989 ) more people vote.
Most of the rest of the recent surge in turnout reflects the uptick in contacting by groups and especially by parties, as well as a greater ability on the part of the public to discern differences between the two major parties. These findings underscore the robustness of Rosenstone and Hansen's explanation that mobilization was the key to understanding patterns of electoral participation, as contacting was a significant correlate of participation both as turnout declined and as it rebounded. While differences in individuals' abilities, opportunities, and contextual measures of campaign activity might also provide us better insight on just who is being mobilized to participate. Moreover, we should also endeavor to understand the extent to which demographic, political, and institutional changes have also affected turnout in nonpresidential elections, as well as how recent changes in mobilization and participation may have helped to shape recent election outcomes (Citrin, Schickler, and Sides 2003; Martinez and Gill 2005; Nagel and McNulty 2000) , patterns of representation (Griffin and Newman 2005; Hajnal and Trounstine 2005) , and public policy (Hill and Leighley 1992; Martin 2003) . 1948 1952 1956 1960 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 followed the same procedure for all respondents to produce weights that would result in the actual VEP turnout rates in each presidential election year.
6 In order to do create the estimated turnout under different conditions in later steps, the secondary weight variable is applied in the estimation of the model. 
